We study the implications of economies of party size in a model of party formation. We show that when the policy space is one-dimensional, candidates form at most two parties. This result does not depend on the magnitude of the economies of party size or sensitively on the nature of the individuals' preferences. It does depend on our assumptions that the policy space is one-dimensional and that uncertainty is absent; we study how modifications of these assumptions affect our conclusions.
We explore an economic rationale for parties. 1 To get elected to a legislature, candidates must inform citizens of their platforms, persuade citizens to support them, and get their supporters to the polls. These activities are all costly, and although some of the cost may be offset by public subsidies, a candidate typically bears a significant burden herself. We study the implications of the cost borne by a candidate decreasing in the number of candidates fielded by the party to which the candidate belongs. The main reason we have in mind for such "economies of party size" is that fixed costs are shared within a party. National advertising, for example, is largely independent of the number of candidates in a party. In addition, if contributors to a party are motivated partly by the possibility of the party's gaining power and passing legislation favorable to them, and large parties are disproportionately powerful, then large parties may attract more contributions per candidate than small parties, also effectively creating economies of party size. All of our results depend only on the existence of economies of party size, not on their magnitude.
Our model, an extensive game with two stages, is illustrated in Figure 1 . In each stage, actions are taken simultaneously. In the first stage each member of a set of politicians chooses whether to stand for election, and if so which position to champion, where championing a position x entails committing to vote, if elected to the legislature, according to single-peaked preferences centered at x . In the second stage each member of a set of citizens chooses whether to vote, and if so for which candidate. A deterministic rule translates votes into a set of elected candidates, whom we call "legislators". We assume that the policy outcome is the median of the positions championed by the legislators. All politicians and citizens care only about the policy outcome-no one is under any illusion about the implications of their actions. (In particular, no citizen votes for a candidate merely because the candidate's announced position is similar to the citizen's favorite position; rather, each citizen considers the implication of her vote for the final legislative outcome.) We impose no assumptions on the politicians' and citizens' preferences beyond specifying their domain. Thus all our results hold for any preferences. We assume that the policy outcome is the median of the positions championed by the legislators because we have in mind that this outcome is determined by a majority vote among the legislators, or a sequence of such votes. We do not model the voting procedure explicitly, but rely on existing results to justify our assumption. (Among an odd number of legislators, the median position beats every other under majority rule pairwise voting. More generally, the median is the only subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of any "binary agenda" (a procedure in which the outcome is the result of a sequence of pairwise votes) in which the players use weakly undominated strategies (see, for example, Miller 1995, Section 6.3).)
We define a party to be a group of legislators who are committed to vote according to single-peaked preferences centered at the same position. In an equilibrium, no politician can deviate to champion a different position and induce a better outcome according to her preferences, given the other politicians' positions. The strategic options of party members in the world are richer-for example, they include coordinated changes in the members' positions. Parties are also long-lived institutions, whereas our model is static. We comment on these points in Section 8.
The rule that determines the candidates who are elected, given the number of votes received by each candidate, is designed to capture simply the idea that the elected candidates are the ones who get the most votes. It is formulated abstractly; it is intended not to model a specific voting rule, but rather to capture the main features of a range of electoral systems. The rule is that a candidate is elected if and only if she obtains at least some quota of votes. We assume that this quota is a continuous nondecreasing function of the profile of vote totals. An example is the function that assigns to each vote profile the maximal number of votes obtained by any candidate in that profile. In this case a candidate has to obtain at least as many votes as any other candidate to get elected-she has to be "first past the post"; in the event of a tie, many candidates may satisfy this criterion. Another example is the function that assigns to each vote profile the total number of votes divided by a fixed number, which defines a voting rule that models a simple form of "proportional representation".
The solution concept we apply to the game is a variant of Nash equilibrium.
The voting subgames, following the candidates' choices of policies to champion, may have multiple Nash equilibria, causing the whole game to have many Nash (and even subgame perfect) equilibria. In particular, the game may have equilibria in which a potentially profitable deviation by a candidate is deterred by a change in the citizens' voting behavior even though the original voting behavior is an equilibrium of the subgame to which the deviation leads and, if the citizens adhere to this behavior after the deviation, the policy outcome remains the same. We exclude such equilibria by assuming that the citizens do not change their voting behavior following a deviation by a candidate unless either a change is necessary because the original behavior is no longer a Nash equilibrium or, even though the original behavior remains an equilibrium, the policy outcome changes.
To describe our solution concept more precisely, suppose that a move by candidate i changes the profile of the candidates' actions from a to a . Denote by b the citizens' voting profile following a . Suppose that i 's move does not affect the policy outcome if the same candidates continue to be elected and that b
is an equilibrium of the subgame following a . Then we insist that the citizens' voting profile in the subgame following a is b . We call Nash equilibria with this property subgame persistent equilibria.
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Our main result (Proposition 1) is that if the policy space is one-dimensional (i.e. there is a single political issue) then any subgame persistent equilibrium involves at most two parties, and if there are two parties then these parties have approximately the same number of candidates. In addition, some candidates may run as independents; if there are two parties, then there are at most three independents, whose positions lie between those of the parties. If the cost of running as an independent is high enough, then all subgame persistent equilibria involve two equal-sized parties. These results hold no matter how small the economies of party size. The positions of the candidates in an equilibrium depend on the magnitude of these economies, but the qualitative characteristics of the equilibria do not.
The main idea behind this result is simple. Suppose that the positions of two parties are to the left of the median position of all elected candidates. Suppose that a candidate from the smaller of these parties moves to the other party. If the set of elected candidates (including the one who moved) remains the same after the candidate moves, then the outcome chosen by the legislature (the median of the elected candidates' positions) also remains the same. Hence, given that the party to which the candidate moves is at least as large as her original party and given economies of party size, the candidate is better off, regardless of her preferences: her move does not affect the outcome, and her cost of running decreases.
To use this line of argument to delimit the set of equilibria, we need to consider the circumstances under which a move by a candidate has no effect on the set of elected candidates. Under subgame persistence, the set of elected candidates remains the same after a candidate's move if the citizens' voting behavior remains an equilibrium and, if the citizens adhere to this behavior, the policy outcome remains the same. Thus we need to consider how a candidate's move affects the citizens' incentives to vote for each candidate.
To illustrate these incentives, suppose there are eight candidates, two at each of four distinct positions. Suppose that in the equilibrium of the voting subgame,
all candidates obtain the same number of votes and are elected. 2 Suppose that one of the candidates at the leftmost position, say candidate i , moves to the center-left position. We claim that this move has no effect on the citizens' voting incentives. Specifically, for any deviation d by a small group of citizens after i moves there is a deviation d (which may be equal to d ) by the same group before i moves that induces the same change in the outcome. If, for example, a small group of citizens voting for one of the four leftmost candidates switches to abstention and this switch causes the candidate for whom they were voting to no longer be elected, then the median changes to the position of the center-right candidates both before and after i moves. Given that i 's move does not affect the citizens' voting incentives, their original voting behavior remains an equilibrium when i moves, so that in a subgame persistent equilibrium i remains elected after her move; because she becomes a member of a larger party, she is better off, so that the original configuration of the candidates' positions is not consistent with equilibrium. Now suppose there are three candidates, who take distinct positions, and that in the equilibrium of the voting subgame all three obtain the same number of votes and are elected. If the left candidate, say candidate i , moves to the position of the middle candidate, she would be better off if all three candidates were to remain elected. But in this case, the citizens' incentives to vote do not remain the same, so that we cannot conclude that all three candidates remain elected.
Specifically, a switch to abstention by citizens voting for the right candidate has different effects before and after i 's move. It causes the candidate on the right not to be elected, 3 which before i 's move changes the policy outcome from the position of the middle candidate to the average of the positions of the left and middle candidates, but after i 's move has no effect on the outcome. Thus after i 's move, the original voting equilibrium is no longer an equilibrium, and hence the citizens' voting behavior must change. In the new equilibrium, i may not be elected, in which case her move would be undesirable. Hence we cannot rule out the original configuration of the candidates' positions as an equilibrium.
librium is a consequence of our assumption of perfect information. In the presence of uncertainty, exact ties would no longer be a feature of the equilibria. 3 Note that the citizens' switch to abstention must affect the outcome, otherwise it would be profitable (because voting is costly), contradicting the fact that the voting profile is an equilibrium.
It turns out that many moves by candidates, like the one in the first example, do not affect the outcomes citizens can induce by changing their voting behavior, so that we are able to significantly restrict the set of equilibrium configurations of the candidates' positions, in particular ruling out all configurations in which there are more than two parties.
We have assumed so far that candidates can commit to the positions they choose. One way to deal with the case in which they cannot commit to these positions is to require that after an election, no candidate can, by changing her position, induce an outcome that she prefers, given the other candidates' positions.
If the candidates' positions satisfy this condition, we say that they are "incentive compatible". Because we impose no assumptions on the candidates' payoff functions, the condition does not directly restrict the qualitative characteristics of the equilibria. However, in an environment in which candidates cannot commit to positions, we need to modify our solution concept to reflect the fact that citizens may change their votes after a deviation by a candidate that results in a configuration of positions that is not incentive compatible. This modification expands the set of possible equilibria, because it reduces the set of deviations that definitely make a candidate better off. We show, however (Proposition 2), that the core idea in our main result persists; in particular, in any equilibrium configuration there are at most two parties with more than two members.
Our model shows that economies of party size-even small economiesexert a powerful influence over the number of parties. Under our specific assumptions, the number of parties is limited to two. In Section 7 we discuss how this result is affected by variants of the model with a multidimensional policy space and uncertainty on the part of the candidates about their chances of election and about the citizens' preferences. In these variants, economies of party size remain potent, but result in the possibility of more than two parties coexisting in equilibrium.
RELATION WITH LITERATURE
The literature on party-formation is large. One focus is Duverger's Law, which asserts that the number of parties is influenced by the electoral system. Duverger (1954, Book II, Ch. I) claims that "the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two-party system" (p. 217) whereas "the simple-majority system with second ballot and proportional representation favour multi-partism" (p. 239). Feddersen (1992) addresses the first part of the law. His result is driven by strategic voting by citizens, unlike ours, which is driven by the strategic maneuvering of candidates. Candidates, in fact, are absent from his model: citizens vote for positions, with positions that obtain many votes interpreted as parties.
The outcome is a lottery among the positions that obtain the most votes. In an equilibrium, the winning positions are tied, so that any citizen, by changing her vote, can induce the election of a single candidate; if the citizens' payoff functions are concave then in the presence of more than two winning positions, some citizen can deviate and induce the certain election of a candidate whom she prefers to the lottery over the tied candidates. Thus in any equilibrium at most two positions receive votes. In our model, too, voters are pivotal in equilibrium. But this feature is not critical; in our model, configurations of the candidates' positions are ruled out as equilibria by moves by candidates, not by changes in the citizens' voting behavior. Our result does not depend on the nature of the citizens' preferences, but rather is driven by economies of party size. 4 The first part of Duverger's Law is given different theoretical support by Cox (1987) and Palfrey (1989) , who formalize the idea that votes for candidates with little chance of winning are wasted, resulting in equilibria in which there are two candidates. This argument, like Feddersen's, rules out configurations as equilibrium on the basis of the citizens' incentives to change their votes rather than the candidates' incentives to change positions. Morelli (2004) addresses both parts of Duverger's law. His model has elements in common with ours: parties decide whether to merge, and then face an election; the policy chosen by the resulting legislature is the median favorite position of the elected candidates. The considerations faced by a party deciding whether to change its position are also common to both models: how will 4 Gerber and Ortuño-Ortín (1998) study a model related to Feddersen's, with a continuum of voters. They assume a continuous outcome function that weights parties by their sizes and gives proportionally larger weight to large parties. (Such a function is not consistent with a winnertakes-all electoral rule.) They show that a unique strong Nash equilibrium exists, in which there are two parties; the nature of the outcome function appears to play a key role in this result. If the vote totals of the three parties do not differ too much, then proportional representation elects one candidate from each party; if the candidate is chosen randomly from the party's candidates in the three districts, then the probability of each candidate's becoming a member of the legislature is 1 3 , making it worthwhile for her to run. Thus when the districts do not differ too much, three parties are active under proportional representation. For preferences that are not sufficiently similar in the three districts, more that one party may be active under plurality rule, and in fact more parties may be active under plurality rule than under proportional representation.
This logic is very different from the reasoning behind our result. Morelli's one-party equilibria under plurality rule have no counterpart in our model because under our assumption of costly strategic voting, no one has an incentive to vote for a single party. The three-party equilibria do not exist in our model because a candidate in the smallest party has an incentive to deviate to one of the other parties, a move that does not affect the legislative outcome and reduces her cost; such an action is not unilaterally available to such a candidate in Morelli's model. Several other ideas relating to party-formation that are more remote from the one that lies behind our model have been explored. Baron (1993) studies a model of proportional representation within the Hotelling-Downs framework.
Citizens are not strategic, party formation is not costly, and the number of parties is fixed. Party size is determined by the fact that a large party has a diverse, and thus harder to please, membership, whereas such a party is more likely to be part of the government and be able to implement a policy appealing to its members. Finally, our model builds on that of Osborne et al. (2000) . Their model can be interpreted as a simplified version of our game in which all candidates are automatically elected and economies of party size are absent. Under these assumptions, there is no cost-based incentive for individuals with different preferences to form parties.
MODEL
Structure of game Our model is an extensive game. The set of players is the union of a finite set P of politicians and a continuum C of citizens. The set of possible policies is denoted X , which we assume to be the set of real numbers. 6 6 All our results hold also when X is a completely ordered subset of a higher-dimensional set. (A set is completely ordered if its members are related by a complete, transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric ordering.)
The game has two stages, in each of which actions are taken simultaneously.
First, each politician decides whether to become a candidate, and if so which position to champion. Then each citizen chooses whether to vote, and if so for which candidate. The citizens' votes determine the candidates who are elected; the policy chosen by the legislature is the median of the policies championed by the elected candidates.
More precisely, the players' actions are specified as follows.
Politicians choose policies Each politician chooses either a member of X , meaning she is a candidate championing the policy she chooses, or the action θ , meaning she is not a candidate.
Citizens vote Each citizen chooses either a candidate (i.e. a politician who chose a member of X ), meaning she votes for that candidate, or the action θ , meaning she does not vote.
A strategy for a politician is simply an action (a member of X ∪ {θ }). A strategy for a citizen is a function that associates with each action profile a for the politicians either a politician j for whom a j ∈ X (i.e. a vote for j ) or θ (abstention). For a strategy profile B of the citizens, we denote by B (a ) the action profile in the subgame following the history a (the profile of citizens' votes when the politicians' positions are given by a ) and by B (a )(c ) the action taken by citizen c (the politician for whom c votes, or θ if she does not vote) in this subgame.
Given the candidates' and citizens' strategies, the set of elected candidates is determined by an electoral rule. Rather than positing a specific rule, we adopt a formulation that encompasses a variety of rules that satisfy some natural conditions. Each rule in the class is defined by a quota function Q : |P| + → + that specifies the measure of votes a candidate needs to be elected. Precisely, for any profile α of vote totals for the candidates, a candidate is elected if and only if she obtains at least Q(α) votes. We assume that the function Q is continuous, nondecreasing, and anonymous (Q(α) = Q(α ) whenever α is a permutation of α ), and has the property that Q(α) = 0 if and only if α = 0.
The following electoral rules satisfy these assumptions.
First-past-the-post Q(α) = max i ∈P α i (a candidate is elected if and only if she obtains at least as many votes as every other candidate).
Hare quota Q(α) = n i =1 α i /k for some number k (a candidate is elected if and only if she obtains at least the fraction 1/k of votes cast).
Fixed quota Q(α) = δ (a candidate is elected if and only if she obtains at least the fixed amount δ of votes).
Note that the continuity assumption on Q is consistent with a small change in the vote totals radically changing the set of elected candidates. For example, under the first-past-the-post rule, if two candidates are tied for the largest measure of votes, then they are both elected, whereas if candidate 1 obtains slightly more votes than candidate 2, only candidate 1 is elected.
Of the assumptions we impose on an electoral rule, two are key: determinism and anonymity. These assumptions together imply that the number of elected candidates varies with the profile of vote totals. A rule that elects the same number, say k , of legislators for every profile of vote totals must select k candidates when more than k are tied for first place, and can do so only either randomly or non-anonymously. We discuss in Section 7.2 the implications of rules that elect a legislature of fixed size.
For any list a of policies, we denote the median policy by M (a ), which we take to be the average of the left and right medians if the number of components of a is even. 7 If no politician is elected, the policy chosen is a fixed default policy d .
Payoffs Each politician cares about the policy chosen by the legislature and incurs a cost that is decreasing in the number of elected candidates who champion the same position as does she. More precisely, we assume that each politician i has a valuation function v i over policies. When the policy chosen by the legislature is x and her action is a i , her payoff is
is a candidate and is elected, 7 All our results generalize to the case in which the policy chosen from a list with an even number is S(a , a r ), where a and a r are the left and right medians and S satisfies S(x , y ) = S(y , x ) and x ≤ S(x , y ) ≤ y whenever x ≤ y .
where N (a i ) is the number of elected politicians who champion a i , C p (k ) > 0 for all k , and C p is a decreasing function for values of its argument at least equal to 1. The assumption that C p is decreasing means that there are economies of party size. Note that we impose no assumptions on the function v i . Note also that we require no relation between C p (0) and C p (k ) for k ≥ 1; the relation between the cost incurred by an unelected candidate and the costs incurred by elected candidates plays no role in our analysis. Note also our assumption that the costs are shared only by elected candidates.
Citizens, like politicians, care about the policy chosen by the legislature. Each citizen incurs a cost if she votes. Specifically, citizen c 's payoff when the policy chosen by the legislature is x is
where C > 0. We impose no assumptions on v .
Define u (c , (a ,b )) to be citizen c 's payoff when the politicians' action profile is a and the citizens' voting profile in the subgame following a is b . (That is, Equilibrium Our solution concept is a variant of Nash equilibrium. In particular, we do not impose on an equilibrium the full force of subgame perfection. To understand our notion, first consider the definition of a Nash equilibrium.
A Nash equilibrium of our game is a pair (a , B ) consisting of a strategy profile a for the politicians and a strategy profile B for the citizens with the property that no politician can increase her payoff by changing her action, given the citizens' strategy profile B , and no voter can increase her payoff by changing her action when the politicians choose a (i.e. B (a ) is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame following the history a ).
An alternative form of this definition is useful. For any given strategy profile B of the citizens, consider the strategic game in which the players are the politicians, each politician's set of actions is the same as it is in the whole game (i.e.
X ∪ {θ }), and the outcome of any action profile a is the policy chosen by the legislature elected when the citizens vote according to B (a ). Denote this strategic game by G B . Then a Nash equilibrium of our (extensive) game is a strategy profile (a , B ) such that a is a Nash equilibrium of G B and B (a ) is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame following a .
Our equilibrium notion differs from Nash equilibrium in two respects. First, instead of requiring that in each voting subgame no single citizen can profitably deviate, it requires that in each such subgame no small group of citizens voting for the same candidate can profitably deviate. Second, it requires that the citizens' votes do not change "unnecessarily" when any single politician changes her action in the first stage.
The first modification is a response to the insensitivity of the electoral outcome to a single citizen's action, given our assumption of a continuum of citizens. We formulate it precisely as follows. Consider the subgame following the politicians' action profile a . Denote by b (c ) the action of citizen c , which is either a candidate (i.e. a politician j for whom a j ∈ X ) or θ (abstention). For any ε > 0 we say that a set of citizens is an "ε-club" if it contains at most the fraction ε of the citizens and all members act in the same way (either they all vote for the same candidate, or none votes). More precisely, an ε-club is a measurable set S of citizens for which 0 < µ(S) ≤ ε, where µ measures the size of a set of citizens, and for some action j ∈ {i ∈ P : a i ∈ X } ∪ {θ } we have b (c ) = j for every c ∈ S. 8 DEFINITION 1. The voting profile b in the subgame following the politicians' action profile a is a small clubs Nash equilibrium (or simply an equilibrium) of the subgame if there exists ε > 0 such that for every ε-club S and every action
where b is the citizens' action profile that differs from b only in that all members of S take the action j .
Given this definition of equilibrium in each subgame, the following definition is the appropriate variant of the notion of Nash equilibrium in the whole game.
DEFINITION 2. A strategy profile (a , B ) is an equilibrium of the game if a is a Nash equilibrium of the game G B and the voting profile B (a ) is a small clubs Nash equilibrium of the subgame following the history a .
Our second modification of the notion of Nash equilibrium is more substantial. Each voting subgame may have many Nash equilibria, with different sets of elected candidates. This multiplicity can support equilibria of the whole game in which a candidate is deterred from deviating in the first stage by an "unnecessary" change in the equilibrium of the subgame. That is, when the candidate deviates, the voting profile changes even though it remains an equilibrium and, if the citizens continue to adhere to it, the policy outcome remains the same.
Our notion of equilibrium rules out such "unnecessary" changes in the voting equilibrium. Precisely, let (a , B ) be an equilibrium of the whole game. Let a i be a deviation by politician i . If the voting equilibrium B (a i , a −i ) specified by (a , B ) for the subgame following the history (a i , a −i ) differs from B (a ) even though B (a ) is an equilibrium of this subgame and the policy outcome remains the same when the voters adhere to this voting profile, then we rule out (a , B ) as an equilibrium of the game. That is, we restrict attention to equilibria in which a deviation by a politician has no effect on the citizens' voting behavior if this voting behavior remains an equilibrium of the subgame reached after the deviation and, if the citizens adhere to this voting behavior, the policy outcome remains the same. We call such equilibria subgame persistent.
To define the notion of subgame persistent equilibrium precisely, say that the voting subgames following a and a are adjacent if a and a differ only in the action of a single candidate. Further, for any pair (a ,b ) consisting of an action profile a for the candidates and a voting profile b for the citizens, define A(a ,b )
to be the profile of positions of the elected candidates. Note that the definition does not restrict either the citizens' behavior in subgames not adjacent to a or in subgames for which B (a ) is not a small clubs Nash equilibrium.
To return to the examples discussed earlier, the eight-candidate example on page 5 is not a subgame persistent equilibrium because when a candidate championing the far-left position moves to the center-left position the voting profile remains an equilibrium, the outcome remains the same if the citizens continue to adhere to this profile, and the candidate who moves leaves a two-member party to become a member of a three-member party. By contrast, the following three-candidate example may be a subgame persistent equilibrium for some specifications of the players' preferences, because any move by a candidate disrupts the voting equilibrium and may result in the candidate's not being elected.
MAIN RESULT
Our main result is that in any subgame persistent equilibrium in which some citizens vote, there are exactly two parties and possibly a small number of independents.
To state the result precisely, define a strategy profile given that voting is costly.) Thus it changes the outcome from the median of the positions of the candidates in E to the median of the positions of the candidates in E \ {j }. In Γ(a ), the outcome thus changes from
by (i), so in order for the change in voting behavior to have the same effect on the outcome in both subgames we need
To illustrate this point, the eight-candidate example considered on page 5 satisfies (ii), but the move of the left candidate to the middle position in the three-candidate example considered in the following paragraph does not. Specifically, if in the latter example the right candidate is absent, the move of the left candidate affects the outcome, changing it from the average of the positions of the left and middle candidates to the position of the middle candidate. Thus we know that the move of the left candidate in the eight-candidate example is profitable, whereas we cannot make the same inference for the move of the left candidate in the three-candidate example.
POST-ELECTION MANEUVERING
After a candidate is elected, she may be able to affect the policy chosen by the legislature by championing a policy different from the one she proposed when (a ,b ) ). That is,
where A(a ,b ) is the profile of the elected candidates' positions (and v i is candidate i 's valuation function).
We now define an equilibrium strategy profile (a , B ) to be a "subgame IC- To state our result, call a party with more than two members a large party and one with exactly two members a small party.
PROPOSITION 2. In a subgame IC-persistent equilibrium with positive voter turnout, the number of large parties is at most two.
•
If there are two large parties, then the sizes of the parties differ by at most two and there are either four additional candidates who form two small parties, three additional candidates who form one small party and an independent, two additional candidates who form a small party, or up to three independents; the positions of the additional candidates lie between the positions of the large parties.
If there is one large party, then there are at least as many independents as members of the party and the positions of all independents are on the same side of the large party; there may be a small party between the independents
and the large party.
• If there are no large parties, then all candidates are independents.
This result says that in addition to the configurations identified in Proposition 1, some configurations in which up to two small parties lie between the two large parties are possible in a subgame IC-persistent equilibrium.
EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM
A subgame persistent equilibrium exists under weak conditions. Assume that the distribution of the citizens' favorite positions has a unique median, denoted m . Assume that the payoff function of each politician is single-peaked and for some number n ≥ 2, the favorite positions of at least n politicians are less than m and the favorite positions of at least n politicians are greater than m . Finally, make two assumptions about the quota function. Suppose that initially every candidate receives the same fraction of the votes. Assume that if the members of a small group of citizens voting for one of the candidates, say j , switch their votes to another candidate, then the quota does not increase (so that if all candidates were elected initially, them all with the possible exception of j remain elected).
Assume also that if a small group of citizens voting for one of the candidates, say j , switches to abstention, the quota falls by less than the size of the group of deviants, so that j is no longer elected.
If, in such an environment, the costs of running as a candidate in an n- 
Similarly a politician i whose favorite position is greater than m does not want to withdraw if
politician who is not a candidate is not elected if she becomes a candidate, so does not affect the outcome.
Party formation 23
Citizens If, in the subgame following a * , the members of a small group of citizens voting for some candidate j switch their votes to another candidate, either all candidates remain elected or all with the exception of j are elected (by our assumption on the quota function), so that the citizens are not better off.
If, in the subgame following a * , the members of a small group of citizens voting for a candidate in the left party switch to abstention, then that candidate is no longer elected (by our assumption on the quota function), so that the outcome changes from m to m + δ. For this deviation not to be
for every citizen c whose favorite position is less than m . Symmetrically, and C are small enough.
Our assumption that the politicians' payoff functions are single-peaked is mild, but is stronger than necessary: we need only that v i (x ) ≤ v i (m ) for every x ∈ [m , m + δ] for a politician whose favorite position is less than m , and symmetrically for a politician whose favorite position is greater than m .
AMELIORATING FACTORS
Our results show that the presence of economies of party size in a static deterministic environment with a one-dimensional policy space dramatically limit the equilibrium configurations of candidates' positions to ones in which there are at most two parties. We now explore how deviations from this environment affect this conclusion.
Multidimensional policy space
To extend the model to a multidimensional policy space we need to find a substitute for the median. This example suggests that the forces of agglomeration in a multidimensional policy space resemble those in a one-dimensional space, although the number of parties to which they lead is greater than two. Specifically, the example suggests that in a two-dimensional space, candidates in the same quadrant can profitably agglomerate, so that no equilibrium has more than four parties with more than two members. Extrapolation from the example suggests that in k dimensions, the number of parties with more than two members is at most 2 k .
Randomness in tie-breaking
We have assumed that if several candidates tie for the highest number of votes, they are all elected. An alternative assumption is that a fixed number of candidates is elected, with ties broken randomly. As in the deterministic case, all candidates receive the same number of votes in any equilibrium. Assume that the cost of running a party is shared by all the candidates in the party who are tied for first place, regardless of whether they are among the candidates randomly chosen to be members of the legislature. Then an argument like the one for the deterministic case shows that the two most extreme parties on the left must have at least These conditions do not limit the number of parties to two: in this case, economies of party size alone do not rule out the existence of more than two parties. However, they do imply that the "fringe" parties are large relative to the size of the legislature. Further, this result, like our results in the deterministic case, holds for any payoff functions; for specific payoff functions we may be able to narrow down the set of equilibria further. The reason that, independently of the payoff functions, we cannot rule out configurations in which the fringe parties are large is that with positive probability the legislature consists exclusively of members of these parties, in which case a move between them may affect the position of the median legislator. If the number of candidates relative to the size of the legislature is large, however, this probability is small, and for many payoff functions any loss a candidate suffers because her move to a larger party changes the median adversely is more than offset by the gain she obtains when the legislature does not consist exclusively of extreme parties, so that in fact such configurations can be ruled out as equilibria.
In summary, when a fixed-size legislature is selected by breaking ties randomly, the existence of economies of party size does not limit the number of parties independently of the candidates' and citizens' payoff functions, as it does when the electoral rule is deterministic. However, the logic underlying the analysis of the deterministic case still holds and puts significant restrictions on the possible equilibrium configurations of the candidates' positions.
Multi-district systems
Suppose that citizens are divided among electoral districts, in each of which there is a set of candidates. Each citizen casts a vote for one of the candidates in her district. Assume that for each district there is a separate quota function; the candidates elected in any given district are the ones who obtain at least the quota of votes for that district, with the quota depending on the profile of votes in the district. As before, assume that citizens and politicians care only about the final legislative outcome, which is the median position of the candidates elected in all districts.
If candidates can move between districts, a key element in our earlier argument fails: such moves must affect the voting profile (because citizens vote only for candidates in their district), so we cannot deduce that they do not affect the set of elected candidates. Because of the possible multiplicity of equilibria in the voting subgames, the failure of this argument suggests that the set of equilibria of the whole game is much larger than it is in the original model. As in the original model, some of these equilibria rely on implausible changes in voting behavior in response to changes in the candidates' positions, but the notion of subgame persistent equilibrium does not eliminate such equilibria; a different approach is required to isolate "sensible" equilibria.
If each candidate can move only within her district, then the incentives in our original model tend to limit the number of parties within each district to two. However, the positions of the parties may differ between districts, so that more than two parties may exist in the society as a whole. For example, if there are two candidates in district 1, at the positions w and z , and two candidates in district 2, at the positions x and y with w < x < y < z , then no candidate can necessarily profitably move to a different position in her district. The obvious move that would be profitable in the original model if it did not affect the voting equilibrium, from w to x , is not possible, because these two positions are in different districts.
In summary, our model is not well-suited to study the (reasonable?) case in which candidates can move between districts, and the number of parties possible in an equilibrium exceeds two if each candidate is restricted to moves within her own district.
Uncertain future
Our model is static. To add a dynamic dimension to it, we need to decide the penalty, if any, that a candidate incurs if she changes her positions from one period to the next. If this penalty is large enough to cause a candidate to pick a single fixed position for all periods, then when contemplating the position to choose she needs to consider the possibility that even if a move does not affect the legislative outcome given the current set of candidates, it may do so for some future set of candidates (who may enter in response to changes in the citizens' preferences, for example). This consideration may lead a candidate to choose a position different from the one she would choose in a static environment. 9
To give a specific example, a far-left candidate may, in a static environment, want to move to a center-left party, but may refrain from doing so in an environment in which the possibility exists of a significant shift in voters' preferences that would put her current position at the center of political spectrum. The incentives that drive our main result are present in such a model, but the greater the possible variation in citizens' preferences, the less significant they are.
CONCLUSION
Economies of scale in a model of static competition between firms leads to the emergence of a monopolist. We have shown that economies of party size in a static deterministic model of single-issue electoral competition leads to the emergence of at most two parties, of approximately the same size. This result is robust to post-election maneuvering, but depends on the existence of a single issue and is diluted by randomness in the electoral rule, by the presence of forward-looking politicians when future changes in the citizens' preferences are possible, and by the existence of a multi-district system.
Our model is stripped of any dynamic elements in order to isolate the role of economies of party size. Given that the environment we study is static, we define a "party" simply as a collection of candidates championing the same position. Actual parties operate in a much richer, dynamic environment; they are uncertain about the issues they will confront, the citizens' preferences, and the parties with which they will compete. To capture at least some aspects of such an environment requires a model different from the ours, in which a party should probably be defined as a long-lived organization.
Our notion of equilibrium is a variant of Nash equilibrium; we consider only deviations by single candidates and small groups of citizens taking the same action. We do not consider deviations by groups of candidates, and in particu- 9 We thank a referee for bringing this point to our attention and for providing the example in the next paragraph. lar do not allow all the members of a party to simultaneously change positions, thereby moving the party's position. Simply adding coalitional deviations to the list of possible deviations would reduce the set of equilibria (thus preserving our result that there are at most two parties). The effect of restricting all deviations, including ones by a single candidate, to be credible (in the sense of coalition proof Nash equilibrium, for example), is unclear.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
We first establish some properties of an equilibrium of a voting subgame. We first argue that no unelected candidate obtains any votes. Suppose to the contrary that candidate i is not elected and obtains a positive measure of votes.
We argue that a small set of the citizens voting for i can switch to not voting without affecting the outcome, thus increasing their payoffs. Let δ be the largest measure of votes received by any unelected candidate, so that δ ∈ (0,q ). Suppose that ε > 0 and an ε-club voting for candidate i switches to not voting. Because the quota function is nondecreasing, the quota does not increase; because it is continuous, for ε small enough the quota remains greater than δ. Thus the set of elected candidates, and hence the policy outcome, remain the same. The members of the ε-club save the cost of voting, contradicting the fact that b is an equilibrium of Γ(a ). Thus no unelected candidate receives votes.
We now argue that every elected candidate obtains the same number of votes, equal to the quota. Suppose to the contrary that candidate i is elected and obtains more than the quota of votes. By the same argument as in the previous paragraph, a deviation to nonvoting by a sufficiently small ε-club voting for candidate i does not affect the set of elected candidates and hence does not affect the policy outcome, so that the members of the ε-club are better off, contradicting the fact that b is an equilibrium of Γ(a ). Thus no candidate obtains more votes than the quota.
We now show that when an unelected candidate withdraws, the citizens' voting behavior remains an equilibrium. Hence all with the exception of i are elected and M (θ , a −i ) = M (a ).
We are now ready to prove Propositions 1 and 2.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Let (a , B ) be a subgame persistent equilibrium with positive voter turnout. We first argue that every candidate is elected, because an unelected candidate who switches to nonparticipation does not affect the set of elected candidates, and hence increases her payoff. STEP 1. In (a , B ), every candidate is elected.
PROOF. Suppose that in the equilibrium (a , B ), candidate i is not elected. Then by Lemma 2, B (a ) is an equilibrium of the subgame Γ(θ , a −i ) following (θ , a −i ).
Hence by subgame persistence, the voting profile B (θ , a −i ) in this subgame is equal to B (a ), so that the policy outcomes in the two subgames are the same.
Candidate i 's deviation to nonparticipation reduces her costs; because it does not change the policy outcome, it is profitable, contradicting the fact that (a , B ) is an equilibrium. Hence every candidate is elected. Now suppose that candidate i deviates to a position x that is occupied by at least two other candidates. We argue that B (a ) remains an equilibrium of the resulting subgame if (a) the policy outcome is not affected and (b) the policy outcome would not be affected even if any one of the other candidates were absent from the election, in both cases assuming that all candidates are elected. Given this conclusion, under subgame persistence B (a ) is the voting profile in the resulting subgame and hence candidate i remains elected.
Precisely, conditions (a) and (b) are If the club deviates to vote for some candidate j = j , the set of elected candidates remains E , changes to ∅ (no candidates are elected), changes to E \ {j }, or changes to {j } (depending on the nature of the quota function).
Deviation by nonvoting ε-club: If the club deviates to vote for some candidate j , the set of elected candidates remains E , changes to ∅, or changes to Party formation 33 {j } (depending on the quota function).
For each possible set of elected candidates after a deviation, we argue as follows.
E :
The policy outcome in both subgames remains M (a ) = M (x , a −i ).
E \ {j } with j = i : The policy outcome in Γ(a ) changes to M (θ , a −j ) and the pol-
. These two outcomes are the same by (2). {j } where j = i : The policy outcome in both subgames changes to a j .
∅:
The policy outcome in both subgames changes to d (the default policy).
E \ {i }: The policy outcome in both subgames changes to M (θ , a −i ).
{i }: In this case, the policy outcome induced by the deviation in Γ(a ), namely a i , differs from the policy outcome induced by the deviation in Γ(x , a −i ), namely x . However, another deviation by the same ε-club in Γ(a ) induces the policy outcome x : rather than deviating to vote for i , the members of the ε-club deviate to vote for a candidate, say j , whose position is x (the existence of which is guaranteed by our assumption that at least two candidates take the position x ). Given that i alone is elected when the club deviates to vote for i (instead of either voting for some other candidate or not voting), by the anonymity of the quota function, j alone is elected when the club deviates to vote for j , generating the policy outcome x . Because B (a ) is an equilibrium of Γ(a ), this deviation does not make the ε-club better off. Thus the deviation to vote for i by the same ε-club in the subgame Γ(x , a −i ), which also generates the policy outcome x , is not profitable.
We conclude that B (a ) is a small clubs Nash equilibrium of Γ(x , a −i ). Thus a j = x } ≥ 2, and
PROOF. If, on the contrary, some value of x satisfies these conditions and candidate i moves to x , then by Step 2 she remains elected and by (1) (iii) If for some j ≥ 1 the number of candidates with position a j is at least 2, then a i = a k if i ≥ 2 and k ≥ 2: Suppose to the contrary that a i = a k and let a k be such that the number of candidates whose position is a k is at least the number whose position is a i . If candidates i and k are both independents, let x = a j ; otherwise, let x = a k . We claim that x satisfies the conditions in Step 3, so that the configuration is not an equilibrium. Condition (1) is satisfied because a i and x are on the same side of the median.
To verify condition (2), note that if the action of a candidate is changed to nonparticipation, then the change in the median is the same whether candidate i 's position is a i or x ; in both cases, the median does not move outside the interval from the position of candidate −1 to the position of candidate 1. Condition (3) is satisfied by the construction of x .
A symmetric argument shows if for some j ≤ −1 the number of candidates with position a j is at least 2, then a i = a k if i ≤ −2 and k ≤ −2.
By (iii), all candidates j with j ≥ 2 are either independents or members of a single party, and similarly for all candidates j with j ≤ −2.
• Suppose these two sets are both parties. If there are two remaining candidates, −1 and 1, then their positions are distinct by (i). Thus either these candidates take distinct positions as independents, or each belongs to one of the parties, or one is an independent and the other belongs to a party.
If there are three remaining candidates, −1, 0, and 1, then their positions are distinct by (ii). Thus either these candidates take distinct positions as independents, or one of them belongs to one of the parties and the other two are independents, or one of them belongs to one party, another belongs to the other party, and the third is an independent.
• Suppose one of these two sets is a party whereas the members of the other set are independents. By (i) and (ii), at most one of the remaining candidates is a member of the party and the others are independents, so that the number of independents is at least as large as the number of members of the party.
• Suppose that both of the sets consist of independents. By (i) and (ii) the remaining candidates are independents, so all candidates are independents.
The proof is now complete. 
Further, ((θ , a −i ), B (a )) is incentive compatible because (a , B (a )) is incentive compatible and the identities and positions of elected candidates are the same in the outcomes of these two strategy profiles. Therefore by subgame IC-persistence, B (θ , a −i ) = B (a ), so that i 's withdrawal is profitable, contradicting the fact that (a , B ) is an equilibrium. Thus every candidate is elected.
We now prove an analogue of Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 1. That is, we give conditions on x such that when candidate i moves to x , the citizens' voting behavior remains an equilibrium and the elected candidates' positions remain incentive compatible. In addition to the conditions in Step 2 of the proof of Proposition 1 we need the following condition.
For any j = i with a j ∈ X and any y ∈ X ∪ {θ } there exists z ∈ X ∪ {θ } such that M (z , a −j ) = M (y , (x , a −i ) −j ).
This condition says that any legislative outcome that can be induced by some candidate j when candidate i 's position is x can also be induced by candidate j when candidate i 's position is a i (given that the position of every other candidate k is a k in both cases). If the condition is satisfied and the citizens' voting profile B is such that all candidates are elected both when their actions are a and when they are (x , a −i ), then if (a , B (a )) is incentive compatible, so is ((x , a −i ),
B (x , a −i )). If the number of candidates is even, (iii ) differs from (iii) in that (iii ) gives a condition under which all candidates j with j ≥ 3, rather than j ≥ 2, belong to a single party and all candidates j with j ≤ −3, rather than j ≤ −2, belong to a single party. Four candidates remain: −2, −1, 1, and 2. By point (i) of the proof of
Step 4 of the proof of Proposition 1, the positions of candidates −1 and 1 differ.
Thus the possible equilibrium configurations of positions are given as follows.
• If all candidates j with j ≥ 3 belong to a single party and all candidates j with j ≤ −3 belong to a single party, then either candidates 1 and 2 are both independents, or one of them belongs to the party on the right and the other is an independent, or both belong to the party on the right, or the two of them constitute a small party, and symmetrically for candidates −2 and −1.
• If all candidates j with j ≥ 3 are independents whereas all candidates j with j ≤ −3 belong to a single party, then candidate 2 is an independent Party formation 39
(otherwise all candidates j with j ≥ 3 belong to a single party by (iii )), and thus candidate 1 is also an independent (because her position differs from that of candidate −1). Candidates −1 and −2 are either both independents, or one belongs to the party on the left and the other is an independent, or both belong to the party on the left, or the two of them constitute a small party.
Symmetric considerations apply if all candidates j with j ≤ −3 are independents whereas all candidates j with j ≥ 3 belong to a single party.
• If all candidates j with j ≥ 3 or j ≤ −3 are independents, then all candidates are independents: candidates −2 and 2 are independents by (iii ) and candidates −1 and 1 are independents because their positions must differ.
The proof is now complete.
